We would like to thank Deon Filmer, Macartan Humphreys, William Keech, Oeindrila Dube, Kate Baldwin, Chris Blattman, Jaimie Bleck, Keith Krehbiel, Alexandra Scacco, Jessica Gottlieb, Guy Grossman, Kristin Michelitch, Danielle Resnick, Nicolas van de Walle, Gwyneth McClendon, and seminar participants at Emory University, the Stanford GSB, the World Bank ABCDE conference, and the NYUColumbia Contemporary African Politics Research Seminar for comments on a previous draft of this paper.
Introduction
There is a strong sense that governments subject to electoral competition are more likely to provide basic services to their citizens. Yet there is little agreement on whether this is the case in practice and even less consensus on the precise mechanisms through which electoral competition a §ects service provision. There is by now an extensive empirical literature on this topic that tends to use broad measures of democracy and then examines whether these measures are correlated with outcomes assumed to be ináuenced by government policy (such as infant mortality) or activity measures (such as levels of education spending) that are assumed to have an e §ect on outcomes. 1 In looking for broad correlations this literature generally sets aside a crucial issue -how are voters supposed to condition their support on a candidateís e §ort to improve basic service provision if this e §ort is not directly observable? Citizens may well know whether the school in their village lacks a roof, but they may not know whether this is attributable to insu¢cient allocation of funds at the central level, or to some implementation failure at the local level.
Presidential candidates often make promises with regard to education, health, or other services, but in an environment where there are problems of implementation (i.e. weak capacity), it is di¢cult for candidates and voters to form an implicit contract over what exactly constitutes a broken promise. We argue that under these conditions, a democratic transition is most likely to a §ect basic service provision in policy areas where voters can verify whether a promise has been kept. A candidateís promise to abolish user fees in health or education can be easily veriÖed ex post. A promise to exert more e §ort to hire teachers, to construct schools, or to improve education quality may be much more di¢cult to verify. Citizens may observe that the end outcome is a failure, but may not know where to attribute blame. As a result, we suggest that democracy may result in increased access to education, without having a similar e §ect on the provision of inputs. 1 Contributions to this voluminous literature include Blaydes and Kayser (2011), Ross (2006) , Kudamatsu (2010) , Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) , Baum and Lake (2003) , Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), Stasavage (2005) , Brown and Hunter (2004) , Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003) , and Min (2010) . Lindert (2004) makes claims about democracy and basic service provision in a historical contest. Amartya Sen (1999) has also long been associated with the idea that democratic governments might be more likely to fulÖll certain needs of their population.
We follow a three step empirical strategy to evaluate this argument. First we show that democracies in Africa have higher rates of school attendance than non-democracies, and that this appears to be due to the proclivity of democracies to abolish user fees for primary schools.
As a second step, we demonstrate the link between democracy and fee abolition by showing that African governments have been particularly likely to abolish primary school tuition fees in the immediate wake of competitive presidential elections. Finally, we use survey evidence from Kenya to provide support for the claim that voters and candidates can only form implicit contracts over veriÖable policy promises, by showing that only attributable policy outcomes ináuence citizensí voting intentions, while non-attributable outcomes have no such e §ect.
Considering our empirical results in greater detail, we Örst use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program, to investigate whether children in African democracies are more likely to attend primary school, and if so what the mechanism for democracyís ináuence appears to be. Individual level data from 29 countries allow us to identify the e §ects of both democratic transitions and fee abolitions on the probability of an individual ever attending primary school. Doing so, we Önd that although democracy is positively related to school attendance, this e §ect is attenuated by the inclusion of the fee abolition variable. Moreover, the fee abolition variable is highly signiÖcant, with its implied e §ect being to increase the probability of school attendance by more than 4 percentage points, even when controlling for democratic transitions. This evidence provides a strong indication that any e §ect of democracy on school attendance may be attributable above all to the proclivity of democracies for abolishing school fees.
The DHS data provide a very e §ective way of investigating school attendance, but we lack similarly high quality cross-country data on the provision of school inputs. As one feasible measure of an outcome that is a §ected by school inputs, we use cross-national annual data on numbers of teachers as reported in the African Development Indicators. Analysis of this data suggests that, contrary to what one might expect, democracies actually tend to have higher ratios of pupils to teachers than do non-democracies. In addition, governments that abolish school fees have higher pupil-teacher ratios than do those in which fees are still applied, implying that fee abolitions are not accompanied by teacher hiring and school construction su¢cient to keep class sizes stable. These results support the principal claim of this paper, that in an environment of weak state capacity democracy may prompt governments to increase education access, but not education inputs.
The second component of our empirical inquiry involves examining the conditions under which governments have abolished school fees. In Section 3 of this paper we present a new data set that records all recent episodes of primary school fee abolitions in African states. Using this dataset, we conduct an empirical analysis that provides strong evidence of a link between contested elections and fee abolition, and we provide evidence that the relationship may indeed be causal. This claim is based upon results of an instrumental variables estimation in which we instrument for election timing (which may be endogenous) using the original o¢cially scheduled date for an election.
The third step in our empirical inquiry involves the use of survey evidence on education policy and voting intentions in Kenya. These data allow us to more directly examine a core assumption of our argument -that attributable policy changes, such as the abolition of school fees, will ináuence voting behavior, but that outcomes for which responsibility is unclear (such as the existence of poor facilities) will be less highly correlated with voting intentions. Analysis of survey data from the Afrobarometer Series provides fairly strong evidence that school inputs and school quality do not have a signiÖcant impact on electoral support, but suggest that electoral support may be positively a §ected by increased access resulting from the abolition of school fees.
Taken together, our three sets of empirical evidence suggest a way forward for researching electoral politics and basic service provision. In a context that applies in many developing countries, where voters observe outcomes on the ground but often have di¢culty knowing when to attribute them to executive actions, policy-oriented electoral competition may still exist.
Under these conditions, competition is likely to hinge on the type of policies where it is possible for voters to assign credit or blame, forming the basis for a potential implicit contract between voters and candidates. 2 Our Öndings in this paper have implications for several distinct literatures. First, and most directly, we provide new conclusions relevant to an existing debate about whether democratization leads to increased expansion of basic education. Several contributions have used either current or historical evidence to suggest that such an e §ect does indeed exist. 3 But there are also prominent examples of autocratic or oligarchic regimes that have pursued universal education policies. 4 Our conclusions suggest that in countries with weak state capacity, by which we mean that executive actions may often fail to translate into implemented outcomes, democracy may indeed have an e §ect on basic education, but only on some policy dimensions and not on others. 5 Second, our Öndings can apply more generally to other policies, such as basic health care, which involve both actions that can be directly implemented by an executive, such as the level of fees, as well as those areas, such as the supply of medicines, where executives can take actions but outcomes on the ground then depend on actions taken by subordinates. There are a number of political economy papers on the link between democracy and health outcomes, but they have not considered this di §erential mechanism. 6 Third, our Öndings also have direct implications for more general debates about the role of information in facilitating electoral accountability. There are a number of contributions that investigate what happens to the relationship between voters and elected o¢cials when voters suddenly acquire more information. 7 But there have been far fewer empirical attempts to consider how, holding constant a low information environment, candidates and elected o¢cials will face incentives to prioritize actions where voters can directly attribute outcomes to executive actions. 8 Finally, our paper also serves as a useful complement to normative economic debates about the desirability of user fees for basic services in developing countries. While there is a large 3 See in particular Ansell (2010), Baum and Lake (2003), Brown and Hunter (2004) , and Stasavage (2005) . 4 Examples include the di §erential success of mass literacy programs in China and India (see Dreze and Loh, 1995) , the investment in mass education by an oligarchic regime in nineteenth century Argentina (see Elis, 2011) , and the program of mass school construction undertaken by the Suharto regime in Indonesia (see Duáo, 2001 ). 5 Ansell (2010) examines how democratic politics ináuences di §erent components of education policy. 6 See in particular Kudamatsu (2010) , Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) , Ross (2006) , and Blaydes and Kayser (2011). 7 See in particular Besley and Burgess (2003) , Stromberg (2004) , Gottlieb (2010) , Keefer and Khemani (2003) , and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) . See also the somewhat contrary evidence in Keefer and Khemani (2010 economic literature on the desirability of removing user fees for basic services in developing countries, there have been few if any positive analyses that investigate when and why governments actually take this step in practice. 9 We argue that, even if changing intellectual sentiment has ináuenced the current move by many African countries to abolish fees for health or education, the nature of electoral competition in an environment of weak state capacity has also played an important role.
Why Would a Government Abolish School Fees?
What are the mechanisms by which democratic transitions may improve basic service provision? Our core claim is that in an environment where decisions taken centrally may not lead to implementation on the ground, it is hard for citizens to verify whether or not candidatesí campaign promises are actually kept. Therefore, in order to facilitate the formation of implicit contracts with voters, candidates will tend to focus on policy promises where the link between executive e §ort and outcomes on the ground can actually be veriÖed. As a consequence, if basic service provision is poor under autocracy then a democratic transition will primarily lead to policy changes on dimensions where outcomes can be clearly traced back to executive actions.
In African countries in recent years candidates for presidential elections have often made extravagant promises regarding health, education, and development. 10 However, in certain cases candidates have also begun to make more speciÖc promises, to abolish primary school fees, to abolish fees for health clinics, or to o §er certain speciÖc services, such as free maternal care.
Local critics often suggest that such actions are ìpopulistî or ìdemagogicî because governments lack the ability to e §ectively deliver services in the absence of fees. Setting aside the question of whether fee abolitions are actually welfare enhancing, an alternative interpretation is to see these actions as the natural development of policy-oriented campaigning in an environment in which voters face di¢culties in tracing speciÖc outcomes back to actions taken by the executive.
As noted in the introduction, there is an extensive literature which suggests that basic 9 For surveys of recent Öndings regarding user fees see Holla and Kremer (2009) and Duáo (2010) . 10 In Gabonís 2009 presidential election, for example, the opposition candidate Paul Mba Abessole campaigned with the somewhat ambitious slogan, ìFree education, free medical care, employment and housing for all.î (Xinhuanet.com, 29th August 2009). services provision may be improved if voters have access to information from sources such as radio, newspapers, or public information campaigns. Much less consideration has been given to whether politicians will respond to an environment of low information by altering certain types of policies but not others. In an environment of poor information combined with low state capacity, candidates in elections still need to construct electoral majorities in some manner. One option under these conditions is to construct support via patronage networks involving transfers of particularistic beneÖts. A less frequently considered possibility is that candidates will seek to make concrete promises, but only on easily attributable policies where their e §orts can actually be veriÖed.
Since the seminal paper by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , it has been observed that in principal-agent relationships in which agents pursue multiple tasks, and where e §ort with regard to some tasks is more easily observable, then agents will face incentives to bias e §ort towards those dimensions where their own e §orts are most directly observable. There have been a small number of applications of this idea in a political economy context. 11 Among these applications, the most directly relevant to our study is the contribution by Mani and Mukand (2007) , who extend a standard retrospective voting model to a context in which a government is charged with producing two public goods with outcomes for one of the two goods being subject to more noise (where e §ort is therefore less ìvisibleî). They predict that greater democratization (modeled as the likelihood that elections are held) prompts an elected o¢cial to widen the gap in resource allocation between the good in which e §ort is observable and the good in which e §ort is not easily observable.
We can apply the insights from the literature on multi-task principal-agent problems directly to the case of African primary education. For a candidate in an African presidential election, fulÖlling a promise to abolish school fees constitutes an action where the resulting outcome is not only very visible, but which is also easily attributable, in the sense that the executiveís own contribution to the outcome can be easily established. In strong contrast, while a promise to hire 11 Holmstrom and Milgromís model is one in which the principal establishes an explicit contract for an agent charged with multiple tasks. Their insight was then extended to a context of implicit contracting (such as that found in a retrospective voting model) by Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a, b) . For political economy applications see in particular Mani and Mukand (2007) , Ashworth (2005) more teachers or build more classrooms may also result in visible outcomes, in an environment of low state capacity these outcomes are less attributable, because problems of implementation make it more di¢cult to judge the extent to which outcomes on the ground result directly from an executiveís actions. 12 There is, however, one di §erence between the environment we consider and that in multi-task principal-agent models. While the multi-task models assume that an agent has a budget or time constraint and must then divide this between two tasks, the scenario we have in mind involves a single observable dimension of action (the choice of fee level) and a second unobservable dimension (e §ort in using the education budget). Increased e §ort on one of these two dimensions does not necessarily imply diminished e §ort on the other. We therefore make no claim that opting for free education prompts an o¢cial to make less e §ort with regard to provision of inputs. We simply suggest that democratization may ináuence behavior to a greater extent with regard to access rather than with regard to inputs.
Correlates of Education Outcomes
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the correlates of education outcomes across African countries, focusing on school attendance and pupil-teacher ratios. The former provides a measure of access to education, or more explicitly of service take-up given conditions set by the government. The latter provide an indicator of the extent to which a government supplies a crucial education input. For each indicator we investigate Örst whether countries with chief executives elected in multiparty electoral competition tend to have systematically di §erent education outcomes when compared with states in which executives are either unelected or are elected in single party contests. The results suggest that democracies have higher attendance rates, although by only a relatively small amount when compared with the non-democratic group.
Contrary to what one might expect, however, democracies do not tend to provide more teachers than non-democracies. The next step in our analysis is to examine the potential mechanism through which democracy may be ináuencing education outcomes. Using information from an original dataset examining school fee abolitions in African states, we introduce a variable for 12 One major source of such implementation problems is corruption that results from channeling funds for basic services through local governments or agencies. See Reinikka and Svenson (2004) for a discussion of this problem in the context of Ugandan primary education. the fee regime into our regressions. For school attendance we observe that countries in which primary school fees have been abolished have notably higher rates of attendance, and in addition once we control for the fee regime there is no longer a statistically signiÖcant di §erence between democracies and non-democracies in terms of attendance rates. In other words, democracy seems to matter because democratic governments are more likely to abolish school fees. For pupil-teacher ratios we observe a similar pattern. Democracies tend to have higher pupil-teacher ratios, but once we control for the fee structure of education (free or fee) this correlation is no longer statistically signiÖcant, and in addition we do observe a very signiÖcant e §ect whereby countries with free primary education have higher pupil-teacher ratios. The broad message of these results may be that democracy prompts governments to increase access but not to increase inputs.
School Attendance
To measure access to education we have used information from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in 29 African countries to construct indicators of school attendance for members of di §erent age cohorts.
We restrict our attention to individuals born since 1980. Within each household surveyed the DHS records the level of educational attainment for each member.
Since household members vary in age, we are then able to use this information to examine the correlates of educational attainment for di §erent age cohorts. 13 If multiparty electoral competition has a signiÖcant e §ect on school attendance, then we should observe that cohorts of individuals who reached the o¢cial entry age for primary school subsequent to a democratic transition are more likely to have attended primary school. The same test can be performed for school fee abolition.
We estimate equation (1) with a linear probability model, a method that facilitates inclusion of household Öxed e §ects, clustering of standard errors by country cohort, and interpretation 13 Kudamatsu (2010) and Franck and Rainer (2012) are the only previous political economy papers that we are aware of to adopt this strategy using pooled DHS data for a group of African states.
of marginal e §ects. 14 For our dependent variable in these estimates we focus on a dummy indicator S that records whether individual i, in household h in country c, has attended primary school even if they did not complete primary school. The choice to focus on school attendance, as opposed to school completion, is dictated by the fact that in a number of our sample countries fees have been abolished quite recently, and so the Örst cohort that has reached the o¢cial entry age subsequent to fees being abolished has not yet reached the standard age for leaving primary school. 15 The speciÖcation in equation (1) controls for household speciÖc Öxed e §ects  h (and therefore also Öxed e §ects at the country level). We also include three further controls denoted by the matrix X ihc . This includes a set of dummy variables for birth order, a set of dummy variables for birth year, and Önally a dummy variable for females.
Our two principal variables of interest are those indicating whether an individual reached school age subsequent to either multiparty competition or free education being established. The variable multiparty takes a value of 1 for all cases in which an individual reached the o¢cial age of school entry subsequent to a countryís becoming democratic. If an individual reached the normal school leaving age prior to a country becoming democratic, then multiparty takes a value of zero. Finally, in cases where an individual reached the normal age of school entry before a country was democratic, but the country subsequently became democratic before they reached the normal school leaving age, then multiparty takes a value between 0 and 1 that is equal to the proportion of their normal school age spent under democracy. 16 The variable free is coded in an analogous manner to the multiparty variable. It takes a value of 1 for all individuals for whom fees were abolished prior to their reaching the normal age 14 When estimating equation (1) without household Öxed e §ects using alternatively a linear probability model and a logit model we obtained almost identical results across these two models, both with regard to the level of statistical signiÖcance for the coe¢cient on our free education variable, as well as with regard to its marginal e §ect. This provides some conÖdence that estimation of a linear probability model with household Öxed e §ects will not produce a seriously misleading estimate. Use of an unconditional logit model with dummies incorporated for Öxed e §ects is not practical for equation (1) because of the very large number of households. The Önal alternative of using a conditional logit model makes it di¢cult to obtain meaningful marginal e §ects from the estimates. 15 The most recent year for which we have data on educational attainment varies by country as detailed in the appendix. 16 As mentioned above, "democratic" here refers to a country in which a chief executive is elected in multiparty competition. Data are from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2001) , and are described in more detail in the Data Appendix. While there are numerous measures of "democracy" available, this is the most appropriate for the task at hand, since our theoretical argument focuses on the role of electoral competition. Repeating the analysis using data from the Polity IV and Freedom House databases (also described in the Data Appendix) provides further support for our primary conclusion, that school attendance is not increased by democracy per se, but by the propensity for democracies to abolish school fees See text and appendix for full description of the data and sources. Following Election is coded "yes" if an election occurred in the same year or the year preceding a fee abolition. Free and fair is coded yes if an election was judged by international observers to have been free and fair as coded by Lindberg (2006) . Victor % and Second % show the proportion of votes garnered by the winner and runner-up, respectively.
of school entry. For individuals for whom fees were in place until their normal age of school leaving, then free takes a value of 0. Finally, in cases where an individual reached the normal age of school entry before a country abolished fees, but the country abolished fees before they reached the normal school leaving age, then free takes a value between 0 and 1 that is equal to the proportion of their normal school age in which schooling was free. We have used a wide variety of sources to construct a new data set that records each instance in which an African government since 1990 has abolished primary school fees. All episodes of fee abolition are listed in Table 1 . 17 Before proceeding further, we should emphasize that pupils in African primary schools are subject to a range of potential fees, and our dataset certainly does not fully capture this variation.
Common fees include o¢cial tuition fees sanctioned by a government, uno¢cial fees levied by associations (often referred to as PTA fees), fees for uniforms, and fees for sitting exams.
When African governments have abolished fees in recent years this has most commonly applied to o¢cial tuition fees, where such fees exist, while also often including provisions regarding association fees levied by schools. We have classiÖed a government as having abolished fees if there is clear evidence that a government has introduced and implemented a law or ministerial decree abolishing tuition or PTA fees. Given the nature of the information we have available,
there is probably little risk that we have ignored signiÖcant fee abolitions. There is a somewhat greater risk that we have incorrectly coded a government as abolishing fees when in practice the move had only a minimal e §ect on the cost of primary education. This should bias our school attendance estimates against Önding an e §ect of fee abolition. Table 1 provides a list of the sixteen fee abolition episodes that we have identiÖed as occurring between 1990 and 2007, the context in which this occurred, and the date. In eleven of the cases fees were abolished in the immediate wake of an election. It is particularly interesting to note that among these eleven cases, eight occurred when a new leader was elected. The fact that it was principally new leaders who took this step suggests two reasons why fee abolitions happened immediately after, rather than immediately prior to, elections. First, they werenít in o¢ce prior to the election. Second, if they do not have a well formed reputation upon election, then they 17 The appendix provides a complete list of the documentation used to classify each abolition (or non-abolition).
might face a particularly strong incentive to engage in easily attributable policy changes early in their term of o¢ce in order to cement their reputation for the future. 18 We will estimate speciÖcations in which we include multiparty and free jointly, as well as speciÖcations where we include them separately. The objective will be to assess whether democracy may have an e §ect on school attendance rates, and whether the e §ect of democracy may be primarily due to the fact that democratic governments are more likely to abolish school fees. We do not estimate speciÖcations with an interaction term multipartyXfree because in our sample fees have been abolished almost exclusively in countries where leaders are selected in multiparty elections. 19 Table 2 reports the results of eight di §erent speciÖcations. In each of these speciÖcations standard errors are clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation within ìcountry cohortsî, with a country cohort deÖned as all individuals born in a given country in a given year. This is important since our multiparty and free schooling variables do not vary within country cohorts.
In the Örst speciÖcation we see that, on average, children of school age in democracies are more likely to attend at least some primary school than are children in non-democratic contexts, though the coe¢cient on multiparty is not quite signiÖcant at conventional levels (p=.058). The implied ìe §ectî of democracy here is a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of having at least some primary schooling. The second column reports results of an estimate in which we substitute the ìfree schoolingî variable for the multiparty variable. We observe a positive and statistically signiÖcant  2 coe¢cient and the implied e §ect of fee abolition is relatively large.
Abolishing school fees at the outset of a childís normal school years is estimated to increase the probability that they have at least some schooling by 5.5 percentage points. In the third column we consider the full speciÖcation in which both the multiparty and free variables are included.
In this speciÖcation the coe¢cient on the multiparty competition variable is no longer close to being statistically signiÖcant, and it is substantially smaller than in column (1). In strong contrast, the implied e §ect of a shift to free primary education is only slightly smaller than in
All individuals
Estimates Linear probability model with standard errors clustered at the country-cohort level.
the column (1) estimates, and it remains statistically signiÖcant.
The evidence from the speciÖcation in column (3) is consistent with our interpretation that African democracies tend to have higher rates of school attendance primarily because democracies are more likely to abolish school fees. However, we should quickly acknowledge that the presence of unobserved factors in the data might be leading us to an erroneous conclusion on this question. 20 One possibility is that when democracies abolish school fees they also take other policy steps, such as building more schools and hiring more teachers, and these factors, which are unobserved in our speciÖcation, might also ináuence attendance. A second potential concern is that governments abolish fees when there is a change in perceived economic returns to schooling, and changes in perceived economic returns to schooling have a direct e §ect on decisions by families whether to send their children to school.
The speciÖcations in columns (4) through (8) in Table 2 repeat speciÖcation (3) for separate quintiles of the wealth distribution. The DHS surveys include a variable for household wealth that is constructed through factor analysis of questions regarding a number of di §erent household assets. 21 The index is then divided into quintiles. It should be emphasized that the wealth quintile measure we use here will be a noisy indicator of true household wealth because while the wealth quintile is constructed by country, our estimates are pooled across countries. This will introduce a further degree of noise to the extent that, for example, a household in the second quintile in the Central African Republic will be signiÖcantly poorer than a household in the second quintile in a richer country like Senegal. With these caveats in mind, the results of the speciÖcations in columns (4) through (8) suggest that fee abolition primarily beneÖts poorer families. There is no e §ect of fee abolition for the richest quintile (column (8)), and then a larger e §ect of abolition on attendance for the middle quintiles. The exception concerns the bottom quintile for which the e §ect of fee abolition is estimated to be smaller than for households in the second quintile. This is a result that we would expect; even after fees are abolished, households still face signiÖcant direct costs of schooling, such as those for uniforms, in addition to facing opportunity costs of foregone economic activities by their children. It is logical that for a range of the poorest families, abolition of school fees will therefore not prompt them to send their 20 See Green, Ha, and Bullock (2010) on this question. 21 See Filmer and Pritchett (1999) for a discussion of this method for measuring household wealth. children to school. 22 Finally, it should also be noted that when compared with the estimates that pool together households from all wealth quintiles, in the separate estimates by wealth quintile there is even less evidence for an e §ect of democracy independent of fee abolition
What do the estimation results from Table 2 suggest? They provide an indication that there
is an e §ect of democracy on African primary education, and furthermore this e §ect may be due above all to the fact that democratically elected African governments are more likely to abolish fees. We should emphasize that this evidence is certainly only preliminary. Though we have adopted a robust estimation strategy, there remains the possibility that unobserved and omitted factors, such as a shift in the demand for schooling, might simultaneously prompt governments to abolish school fees and to expand education. One way to tentatively explore this possibility is to add country speciÖc linear time trends to the speciÖcation in equation (1). When doing so we continued to observe very similar results regarding democracy and fee abolition. Even so, it is certainly possible that some unobserved factors, such as sudden increases in returns to schooling, may be correlated with either fee abolitions or democratization and may not be adequately controlled for even with the inclusion of country speciÖc time trends. Finally, as we suggested above it may be the case that the positive coe¢cient on the school fees variable is picking up the e §ect of other reforms that governments launch simultaneously with fee abolition, such as new investments in teachers and schools. Given available data, this issue is di¢cult to deal with in a cross-country comparative context. However, in the next sub-section we will examine evidence on numbers of teachers and pupil-teacher ratios as one such possibility. At least as far as teacher numbers are concerned, the evidence in the next section will show that governments which abolish fees do not hire more teachers when compared with governments that maintain fees.
Numbers of Teachers
While the DHS surveys provide us with high quality data on school attendance that can be used in a comparative setting, we lack a similar source when it comes to school inputs or quality 22 Another prominent issue is whether abolishing school fees leads to a reduction in gender di §erentials in school attendance rates, a result that Deininger (2003) found for Uganda. Using our pooled DHS data we do not Önd evidence of di §erential e §ects by sex. of instruction. This in itself is not surprising because school quality is inherently di¢cult to measure, and school inputs are costly to catalogue. 23 As one feasible measure that is a §ected by school inputs, we will focus on the cross-national data on numbers of teachers that is reported in the African Development Indicators and which is originally collected by UNESCO. This data, which is based on self-reported questionnaires compiled by national governments, may certainly contain a substantial degree of error and/or bias. Our sample for this analysis includes 38 countries over the period between 1990 and 2007, but this is a highly unbalanced panel due to the large number of missing observations. We will use two separate dependent variables in our analysis here. The Örst is the ratio of pupils in school to the number of teachers -pupils/teachers. The second dependent variable is the number of children under age 15 in a country (our best proxy for the school age population) divided by the number of teachers -potential pupils/teachers. The Örst variable is a measure of input provision conditional on actual demand for education. The second variable is a measure of input provision relative to potential total demand.
We will examine whether African democracies have systematically di §erent teacher numbers (with y representing one of our two dependent variables) once we control for country Öxed e §ects and common time e §ects. We will also examine if the presence or absence of primary school fees is associated with di §erent teacher numbers.
In equation (2) above the dependent variable is either pupils/teachers or potential pupils/teachers.
Within our sample, the mean value for the former is 47 and the standard deviation is 12. The sample mean for the latter is 166 and the standard deviation is 90. We regress our two dependent variables on: (1) A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a chief executive is elected in multiparty competition and zero otherwise, (2) a dummy variable for whether primary school fees are in place at the beginning of the year, (3) a set of country Öxed e §ects ( i ), and (4) a set of year dummies ( t ). Standard errors are clustered by country.
Three speciÖcations are reported in Table 3 that use the actual number of pupils divided by the number of teachers as the dependent variable. We see in the Örst speciÖcation that democracies actually tend to have higher ratios of enrolled pupils to numbers of teachers when compared with non-democracies. In the second speciÖcation we observe that countries with primary school fees in place are estimated to have roughly 8 fewer students per classroom than are countries in which fees have been abolished. This is a large e §ect, representing two thirds of a standard deviation. This Öts with what has been observed in a number of countries in which school fee abolitions have resulted in signiÖcant increases in enrollments, and even after a number of years (taking account of the fact that new teachers cannot be recruited instantaneously) pupil-teacher ratios have remained above pre-reform levels. However, we cannot, of course, tell from this estimate to what extent higher pupil-teacher ratios in countries that have abolished fees result from increased demand for education versus changes in the supply of teachers. Now consider the third column in Table 3 , in which the multiparty and fees variables are included simultaneously. The coe¢cient on the fees variable remains virtually unchanged from the speciÖcation in column 2. In contrast, the coe¢cient on the multiparty variable is now substantially smaller than in the column 1 estimation, and it is no longer statistically signiÖcant.
The speciÖcations in columns (4) through (6) in Table 3 use the potential number of pupils divided by the number of teachers as a dependent variable. Using the potential number of pupils provides us with one way of focusing on education inputs independent of take-up of educational services. In these speciÖcations we see essentially no evidence that democracies provide di §erent numbers of teachers relative to the potential student population when compared with non-democracies.
How should we interpret the above results? First of all, any interpretation we attempt should be made with caution. With this said, it is striking how little evidence we see in Table 3 to support the idea that democracies might increase education provision by employing more teachers or that governments abolishing school fees will make accompanying e §orts to hire substantially more teachers. Teacher numbers have been increasing across the board within the set of African countries in our sample, a fact controlled for by the year Öxed e §ects in these regressions. But once we control for this fact, there is no indication that democracies appear to be any di §erent from non-democracies and no indication that countries abolishing fees make su¢cient investments in inputs to keep pupil-teacher ratios stable.
Presidential Elections and Fee Abolition
In the previous section we established that multiparty electoral competition is associated with higher rates of school attendance (potentially reáecting greater access) as well as with higher pupil-teacher ratios (potentially suggesting that inputs have not increased in step). However, once we control for whether school fees are present, democracy is no longer signiÖcantly correlated with these two education outcomes. This suggests that if electoral competition has recently made a di §erence for primary education in African countries, it is above all through democracyís e §ect in prompting governments to abolish school fees. In this section we continue the inquiry by examining the conditions under which governments have abolished fees. We
Önd that governments have been particularly likely to abolish fees in the immediate wake of presidential elections. This supports our interpretation that a promise to abolish school fees is a declaration that can be made in a campaign and which can subsequently be subject to veriÖcation, even in an environment of weak state capacity. In our analysis we pay particular attention to the possibility that any observed correlation between elections and fee abolition might be endogenous -elections might only take place in ì good timesî where it is easier to deliver on a promise to abolish fees.
Our primary purpose in this section is to consider the conditions under which African governments have switched from allowing primary schools to levy fees to a no fees regime. Since over the last two decades this has been very much a one-way movement, with no governments that abolished fees o¢cially reinstating them, it makes sense to conduct a survival type of analysis in which we examine how long a government ì survivesî with fees before abolishing them. To do this in a simple but sound way we estimate the following equation in which a dummy variable abolition takes a value of zero for all years in which a country has primary school fees, a value of 1 in the year in which fees are abolished, and then the country is dropped from the sample for all subsequent years. This ensures that we are estimating the probability of a fee abolition. 24
In equation (3) the probability of fee abolition in country i in year t is estimated for a sample of 39 African countries between 1990 and 2007. We include a dummy variable, election, that takes a value of one if a country has experienced a presidential election in the current or the previous year and zero otherwise. 25 If we wanted to test the proposition that candidates are most likely to promise to abolish fees if an election is expected to be particularly competitive, then we might want to use a measure that also incorporates further information about the electoral environment. However, in doing so we might then introduce a greater possibility of endogeneity bias in our regressions. Factors causing an election to be competitive might also have a direct e §ect on the feasibility of abolishing fees. As a consequence, for our core estimates we will stick with a more minimalist measure of whether an election occurred irrespective of the electoral environment, though we will consider several alternative measures below. Even with our minimalist measure, we might still be concerned that there is a risk of bias in our estimates.
Whether an election takes place at all depends on certain conditions, such as a modicum of political stability, and the decision by an incumbent regime to actually face the electorate. It may be that when these conditions are favorable, conditions are also more favorable for abolishing school fees, perhaps because a countryís public Önances are relatively sound. To deal with this possibility, we will also present instrumental variables estimates in which we instrument for whether an election occurs using a variable based on the o¢cially scheduled election date, as determined at the previous election. In addition to the election variable, we also include a set 24 following Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). 25 This is a simple way of taking account of the fact that a fee abolition might occur swiftly after an election but not in same calendar year. This was the case, for example, with Kenya in 2003. It it is worth noting that in practice, all of the electorally connected fee abolitions in our sample have occurred subsequent to elections rather than prior to them. of year Öxed e §ects ( t ), to take account of the possibility that as time has elapsed since 1990, systemic features, which could include pressure from donors or changing ideas about optimal policy, have made it increasingly likely that any country would abolish primary school fees.
Finally, in some speciÖcations we also control for country Öxed e §ects ( i ).
There is some debate whether the most desirable way to estimate an equation with an endogenous dummy variable (as is the case with the election variable in equation (3)) is with a non-linear model (such as probit and ivprobit) that is constrained to produce estimated probabilities between 0 and 1, or, alternatively, whether a linear probability model (estimated via either OLS or 2SLS) is preferable because it is not dependent on as restrictive a set of assumptions. 26 In practice we obtained quite similar results using both approaches. As a result, in this section we will report the linear probability model estimates, which are more straightforward to interpret. In the ì further resultsî section of the appendix we then report probit and instrumental variables probit estimates of equation (3). Table 4 presents twelve di §erent estimates of the probability of fee abolition. In the Örst column the election variable is coded so that it takes a value of 1 if there has been an election in the previous or current year, irrespective of whether the election was judged to be free and fair or whether the election outcome was particularly lopsided. Here we observe that the coe¢cient on the election variable is statistically signiÖcant. The implied e §ect of having an election is also relatively large. In a non-electoral year we would expect a country to have a 1.3% chance of shifting to a no fees regime. In an electoral year we would expect this probability to rise to 5.8%.
For the estimate presented in column (2) we alter the deÖnition of the ì electionî variable, coding as 0 all cases in which there was an election but it was not judged by international observers to be free and fair. 27 When we do this we observe that the coe¢cient on the election variable remains statistically signiÖcant. The implied magnitude of the e §ect is now also substantially larger. For the estimate in column (3) we reclassify particularly lopsided elections (those where the winnerís share is greater than 80%) as being cases where the ì electionî variable is set equal to zero. This is based on the idea that a very lopsided election outcome may indicate that the election outcome was preordained and therefore there was less need to form any sort of a contract 26 See Angrist (2001) . 27 This is based on the data set collected by Sta §an Lindberg (2006) that he has subsequently updated.
with voters over abolishing school fees. In column (3) the coe¢cient on the election variable remains statistically signiÖcant and of similar magnitude to that in the column (1) estimate. The three speciÖcations in columns (4), (5) , and (6) repeat the initial speciÖcations while including a full set of country Öxed e §ects. These will control for any constant and observed di §erences between countries, such as those due to colonial heritage, geographic location, or the Öxed length of electoral terms, in addition to any constant and unobserved sources of heterogeneity. As can be seen, the results when including country Öxed e §ects are very similar to those reported in the Örst three columns.
The estimates in the Örst six columns of Table 4 control for a number of di §erent possible time speciÖc or country speciÖc factors that might produce a spurious correlation between presidential elections and the abolition of school fees. Nonetheless, it is still entirely possible that these results are ináuenced by a form of endogeneity bias in which some time variant and country speciÖc factor simultaneously prompts rulers to hold elections and to abolish school fees. It might, for example, be the case that when economic growth is robust and/or public Önances are sound, rulers will be more willing to face the electorate and simultaneously more able to eliminate school fees. To deal with this possibility, in columns (7) through (12) of Table 4 we present a set of instrumental variables estimates. We construct an instrumental variable, called ìscheduled electionî, that is deÖned in the following manner. The ìscheduled electionî variable takes a value of 1 for years in which an election would normally be scheduled, counting forward from a countryís previous presidential election (of any sort). 28 Since all of our sample countries have had executive elections of one sort or another, this is an instrumental variable that can be calculated for each country in the sample. Since the vast majority of African countries have presidential systems with Öxed terms, in practice the ìscheduled electionî variable is a very strong predictor of the ìelectionî variable. 29 We also need to have conÖdence that the exclusion restriction for this instrumental variable is satisÖed. The exclusion restriction would be violated if when choosing an election date, a leader decided to hold an election in year t + 1 28 In cases where a country held a presidential election but then failed to hold one at the scheduled date, the instrument is constructed by continuing to count forward. So, for example, Angola had its last presidential election in 1992, and the o¢cial presidential term is Öve years. For Angola "scheduled election" takes a value of one in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. It takes a value of zero in all other years. 29 The non-presidential regimes in our data set are Lesotho, Ethiopia, and Burundi (though Burundi later shifted to presidential elections). For these countries we focus on legislative elections.
(1) In columns (7) through (12) of Table 4 we present the instrumental variables estimates. In each case with these estimates the coe¢cient on the election variable is statistically signiÖcant, and it is now also larger in magnitude than in the previous estimates contained in columns
(1) through (6) . The larger magnitudes for the coe¢cient on the election variable might be explained by the fact that when rulers alter the timing of elections away from a previous schedule, then they are less likely to o §er policy changes such as the elimination of school fees. With this said, we should certainly not over interpret these results. Given the conÖdence intervals for both the OLS and 2SLS estimates and our relatively small sample size, the di §erence in coe¢cients may simply be attributable to sampling variance. We can also see from the Örst stage statistics at the bottom of Table 4 that our 2SLS estimates deÖnitely do not su §er from a weak instruments problem.
In addition to the instrumental variables estimates, we also considered a number of additional (unreported) speciÖcations in order to establish whether the correlation between presidential elections and school fee abolitions may be driven by an omitted variable. We Örst investigated whether the fact that governments abolish school fees following elections simply reáects the fact that they are likely to abolish any type of policy immediately after they have been given an electoral mandate. As one way of considering this, we investigated whether governments were more likely to alter trade policy (in this case measured by the average simple tari §) following elections. There was no indication that this was the case.
Second, we also considered the possibility that a countryís status with the donor community ináuences the decision to abolish school fees. In practice, countries receiving higher levels of total overseas development assistance were slightly more likely to abolish school fees. However, the most observable pattern in the data was, not surprisingly, that governments that abolished fees tended subsequently to receive more aid after this policy move. This raises the possibility of the following endogeneity problem -governments might be in good standing with donors if they were democracies, and therefore they might be more likely to abolish fees because they would anticipate substantial aid áows following this decision. In this case the e §ect of electoral competition on fee abolition would follow an indirect path, rather than the direct path that we have suggested. However, if electoral competition had only this indirect e §ect, then we would not expect democracies to be particularly likely to abolish fees in the immediate wake of elections as opposed to during any other year. Since we do Önd this, we retain conÖdence in our hypothesized mechanism.
Overall, the estimates in Table 4 provide a strong indication that elections and primary school fee abolitions have been strongly correlated and that there is very likely a causal relationship between the two variables.
Survey Evidence on Voter Intentions in Kenya
So far we have argued that electoral competition has prompted African election candidates to promise policies where the outcomes can be directly attributed to their e §orts, such as abolishing school fees, but it has not allowed candidates and voters to enter into implicit contracts over education inputs or school quality. As evidence to support this claim, we have shown that
African democracies tend to have higher rates of enrollment, combined with higher pupil-teacher ratios, and both of these e §ects appear to be driven above all by the abolition of school fees.
We have then provided estimates to show that having an election signiÖcantly increases the likelihood that an African government will abolish fees. What we have not provided is more direct evidence to show that voting behavior might actually be ináuenced by education outcomes and education policy. To do this we now make use of a survey of individuals in Kenya that was implemented after the Kenyan governmentís abolition of primary school fees, a decision made in December of 2002. While promises to make primary education free had been made at various times in Kenya since independence, this was the Örst instance of a concrete promise made in the immediate run up to a multiparty election. 30 It was a promise that the victorious opposition candidate, Mwai Kibaki, soon acted upon with the announcement that as of 1 January 2003, primary schools in Kenya would no longer be allowed to levy fees. Subsequent to this decision, there was a large enrollment response. This was combined with the observation that class sizes in many schools grew very considerably, and complaints began to emerge that without su¢cient increases in education inputs (i.e. teachers, classrooms, materials), education quality would su §er. 31 In what follows we Örst consider whether survey evidence shows that individuals from poorer households are more likely to suggest that they favor a free primary education policy even if this involves compromising quality. Such a Önding would provide further support for the core argument of this paper. We then use the survey evidence to examine whether expressed intention to vote for President Kibaki is correlated with a policy outcome where his actions are observable (school fee abolition) as well as with outcomes where his actions were not observable (provision of inputs).
Preferences for Free Schooling
Two years after the abolition of school fees, round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in Kenya, with respondents asked whether they would vote for President Kibaki if an election were held that day. In addition, interviewees were asked whether they preferred to have primary education be free even if this meant lower quality of education, or whether they instead preferred that fees be charged so as to maintain standards. 32 In the original Afrobarometer data individuals were given the option of agreeing strongly with this proposition, agreeing, disagreeing, disagreeing strongly, or responding that they ì did not knowî. In practice very few individuals responded that they ì did not knowî, and in the regressions reported in this section we lose little estimation precision by excluding the ì donít knowsî and then dichotomizing responses between individuals who either agreed (strongly or not) or disagreed (strongly or not) with the proposition. In the remaining analysis in this section we will therefore refer to a dichotomous 30 See the interesting discussion in Oketch and Rolletson (2007) for background. 31 An excellent survey of developments in the Kenyan educational system is provided by Lucas and Mbiti (2010) . 32 See the data appendix for the exact wording of this and all other Afrobarometer questions used in this section.
variable ì freeî which takes a value of one if the individual responded that schooling should be free and zero otherwise.
The pattern of responses to the free schooling question varied between wealth quintiles in exactly the way we might expect given the estimation results reported above using the DHS survey data. This provides further support for the main argument of this paper as it pertains to distributional politics. To demonstrate this we used responses to six Afrobarometer questions involving household assets to construct a wealth index in the same way that the DHS wealth index is constructed. 33 We then divided this index into quintiles and investigated how responses to the fees question varied by wealth quintile using the following speciÖcation.
In equation (4) the probability of preferring free education is estimated as a function of a matrix of dummy variables for each wealth quintile W, in addition to a set of district Öxed e §ects ( j ). The estimated likelihood of saying that education should be free was highest for the lowest quintile and decreased with each successive quintile. The di §erences were quite dramatic, with 60% of individuals in the bottom quintile saying that education should be free, even if this compromises quality, whereas only 38% of individuals in the top quintile responded in the same manner. 34 There continued to be a statistically signiÖcant di §erence in responses to the fees question between wealth quintiles even when we also introduced a set of Öxed e §ects for self-identiÖed ethnic a¢liation. This is signiÖcant because of the fact that wealth levels certainly do vary in Kenya between ethnic groups. 35 33 The Afrobarometer survey includes questions on only a small number of goods, but these still may be useful for constructing a wealth index. The six goods included are whether the household has a book, a radio, a television, a bicycle, a motorcycle, and a car. Using factor analysis we constructed an index based on the Örst factor from responses to these six questions. 34 Based on a probit estimation with standard errors clustered at the district level, the predicted probabilities derived from the probit estimation are as follows. An individual from a household in the 1st (bottom) quintile is estimated to have a 60% probability (standard error .027) of preferring free schooling. An individual in the 2nd quintile would have a 53% probability (standard error .026). An individual in the 3rd quintile would have a 53% probability (standard error .026). An individual in the 4th quintile would have a 45% proability (standard error .037). An individual in the 5th quintile would have a 38% probability (standard error .035). 35 We were also able to repeat the above exercise for a pooled sample including responses from all countries in round three of the Afrobarometer survey. We found a similar relationship; individuals at successively higher quintiles of the wealth distribution were less likely to respond that they favored free education.
In sum, the Afrobarometer evidence provides a strong indication that African respondents are sensitive to the distributional e §ects of free education policies and that there is a trade-o § involved. This is a particularly interesting result given the paucity of recent academic discussion of distributional politics involving di §erent income or wealth groups in Africa, as opposed to distributional considerations between ethnic groups. 36 
Voting Intentions
In addition to asking respondents whether schooling should be free, the Kenya Afrobarometer survey also included several speciÖc questions about experience with local schools. We can use this information to try to establish whether responses on the free schooling and school conditions questions are correlated with the expressed intent to vote for the incumbent, President Kibaki.
The Afrobarometer survey asked whether individuals had experienced problems with schools involving overcrowding, lack of materials, or poor facilities. We might expect that individuals experiencing any of these three problems might be less likely to express willingness to vote for President Kibaki to the extent that these problems reáected insu¢cient e §orts at the central level to steer funds toward schools. To consider this question we use the following model to estimate voting intentions for President Kibaki as a function of the di §erent survey responses.
In the above equation, an indicator variable for expressed intention of individual i in district j to vote for Kibaki if an election were held that day is regressed (using a probit model) on two survey response variables in addition to a set of district Öxed e §ects that control for unobserved factors that might ináuence Kibaki support. The dichotomous variable ì freeî involving preference for free schooling remains deÖned as above. The variable ì school problemî takes a value of 0 if the individual has never experienced the problem in question, 1 if the individual has experienced the problem ì once or twiceî, 2 if the problem has been experienced ì a few timesî, and 3 if the problem has been experienced ì oftenî. Respondents were also given the option of saying that they had no experience with schools (presumably because they did not have school 36 Though see the interesting work by Resnick (2010) in this regard.
age children), and we excluded these individuals from the sample, hence the smaller sample size for some regressions. Three separate school problems are considered, each of which reáects a lack of inputs: (1) overcrowded classrooms (2) poor conditions of facilities, and (3) problems with textbooks and supplies. Table 5 reports results of seven di §erent estimates of equation (5) with standard errors clustered at the district level. In the Örst column we see a positive and statistically signiÖcant correlation in which individuals preferring free primary schooling are more likely to express the intention of voting for President Kibaki. The implied e §ect of free schooling here is also large,
an individual believing that schooling should be free is estimated to have a 57% probability of voting for Kibaki whereas an individual believing otherwise is estimated to have a 48%
probability of voting for Kibaki. We must remember, of course, that there is a severe risk of bias in these estimates, and they should not be given a causal interpretation. Individuals with a prior preference for President Kibaki might be likely to take his actions on free schooling as a cue that determines their response to the free schooling survey question.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 6 consider the correlation between Kibaki voting intentions and reports of school quality problems. Interestingly, there is no evidence whatsoever that individuals who report having experienced problems with overcrowding, lack of supplies, or poor facilities are less likely to say that they would vote for President Kibaki. This is particularly noteworthy, because we would normally expect there to be a bias on the  2 coe¢cient for the reason described in the previous paragraph. In columns 5 through 7 we estimate the full speciÖcation including the response to the fees question together with responses on the di §erent school quality questions. Here we continue to observe that individuals preferring free schooling also express the intention to vote for President Kibaki, but experiencing school problems has no apparent correlation with Kibaki voting intentions. We also estimated an (unreported) speciÖcation in which we used factor analysis to produce a single variable drawing information from three school conditions questions and then entered this into the regression. We continued to observe no statistically signiÖcant relationship between reported experience with school conditions and Kibaki voting intentions, and the coe¢cient on free schooling remained signiÖcant.
(1)
Respondents prefer free schools .276
.303
.300
.316
(. Table 5 : Probit Estimates of the Probability of Expressing Intention to Vote for President Kibaki.
All speciÖcations include district level Öxed e §ects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level.
The major implication of the estimates in Table 6 is that if individuals do not blame a chief executive for problems experienced by their individual schools, there may not be very large electoral rewards for pursuing a policy designed to improve school inputs or quality.
Conclusion
There is not yet a consensus on whether the institution of electoral democracy has a positive e §ect on the provision of basic services in poor countries. We know even less about the speciÖc ways in which such an e §ect might operate. Starting from the principle that poor countries, such as those in Africa, tend to have limited and uncertain state capacity, we suggested that this makes it more di¢cult to attribute policy outcomes to executive actions. In this environment abolishing primary school fees provides an important example of an attributable policy that victorious election candidates can actually implement directly in a short amount of time and where voters can easily judge whether a promise is kept. An alternative promise, such as to exert e §ort to build more schools or to hire more teachers, cannot be as easily veriÖed. So, when it comes to provision of these inputs, we should expect the arrival of electoral democracy to have a more muted e §ect on outcomes. We have provided three types of evidence to support this argument. First, using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys we have suggested that if African democracies tend to have a higher percentage of children that attend primary school, this is due primarily to the fact that democratically elected governments are more likely to abolish primary school fees. Second, using the Örst cross-country evidence on school fee abolitions, we have shown that this phenomenon appears to be electorally determined. 
A Further Results

A.1 Probit Estimates of Probability of Fee Abolition
The following table reports results of probit and ivprobit estimates of equation (3) as an alternative to the linear probability model reported in Table 4 . 37 As in our linear probability model estimates, the coe¢cient on the election variable is statistically signiÖcant in all speciÖcations, and we again observe that the magnitude of the implied e §ects is slightly larger in the instrumental variables estimates. Based on the column (2) speciÖcation, in a non-election year a country would be estimated to have a 1.2% chance of shifting to a no fees regime. In an electoral year this probability would rise to 5.4%. This result is nearly identical to that obtained using a linear probability model. Based on the column (4) estimate, in any given non-electoral year, a country would have a probability of close to zero of shifting to free primary education. In contrast, in an election year a country would have a roughly ten percent probability of doing so.
(1) 
B Data Appendix
This appendix describes all procedures for coding and analyzing data that have not previously been presented in the main text. We discuss the 29 DHS surveys that were used for the Section 2 estimates, the Afrobarometer survey data, and we devote the most extensive attention to describing the coding of our school fees variable.
B.1 Demographic and Health Surveys Data
The estimates in Section 2 use data from DHS surveys in 29 African countries. In each case we used the most current survey available at the time of writing. The DHS surveys used for the analysis were: Benin The DHS uses a standard Household Schedule survey instrument across countries (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/aboutsurveys/dhs/questionnaires.cfm), which makes it straightforward to merge the datasets from di §erent surveys using a country-speciÖc identiÖcation code.
B.2 Democracy and Elections Data
The dates of presidential elections were taken from http://africanelections.tripod.com. We code a country as "democratic" for any year in which the chief executive was in place as a result of multiparty electoral competition in which more than one party won votes. This data comes from the World Bankís Database of Political Institutions constructed by Thorsten Beck, Philip E. Keefer and George R. Clarke (http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40). We use the databaseís Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness, which codes the elected status of the executive for each country-year on a 7-point scale: 1 -No Executive; 2 -Unelected Executive; 3 -Elected, 1 candidate; 4 -1 party, multiple candidates; 5 -multiple parties are legal but only one party won votes; 6 -multiple parties DID win votes but the largest party received more than 75% of the votes; 7 -largest party got less than 75%. We take a country to be democratic for any year in which it is coded 6 or 7 on this scale. For robustness we repeated the analysis using data from the Polity IV and Freedom House databases. For the Polity IV data we code a country as "democratic" for any year in which the Combined Polity Score is greater than zero. This data comes from the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010 constructed by Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers and Monty G. Marshall (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). For the Freedom House Data we code a country as "democratic" for any year in which the country was classiÖed as "Free" or "Partly Free". This data comes from the Democracy Timeseries Data Release 3.0 constructed by Pippa Norris (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm), and is available through to 2007.
B.3 Afrobarometer Data
The estimates in Section 5 used Kenyan data from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer surveys. We report here the exact wording for the key questions that we used in the analysis. The same Afrobarometer survey also asked several questions regarding experience with ì poor teachingî and ì absent teachersî. As these would be less likely to be a §ected by presidential policy we did not include them in the regressions.
Using the Afrobarometer data we constructed a wealth index by conducting factor analysis of responses to Questions Q93A, Q93B, Q93C, Q93D, Q93E, and Q93F using maximum likelihood. We then used the Örst factor as an index of wealth, and divided individuals into wealth quintiles. To the greatest extent possible using Afrobarometer data, this replicates the method used to produce the DHS wealth indicator.
B.4 Coding of School Fee Abolitions
We used a variety of types of evidence to code for 39 African countries covering the period between 1990 and 2007 whether a government maintained a policy of allowing fees to be levied for primary education, or whether a government acted to abolish fees. As discussed in the main text of this paper, African primary school students can encounter a range of di §erent costs that could be called fees. These include o¢cial tuition fees, fees levied by community associations (often referred to as PTA fees), exam fees, and fees for uniforms. Moreover, actual practice may vary from region to region within individual countries. There is only a very limited number of existing studies that attempt to document the extent and type of fees prevailing for a group of African countries for a set point in time. The study by Raja Bentaouet Kattan (2006) is the most detailed example of which we are aware. No existing study attempts to track the evolution of fees for a set of countries over time, though the report by Katarina Tomasevski (2006) does provide a wealth of information on a country by country basis, that often refers to policy changes. Given these constraints, we have sought to use these two sources supplemented with a number of additional sources for individual countries in order to produce a relatively crude binary indicator that records whether a government has announced an abolition of tuition and/or PTA fees and then taken legal or ministerial action to actually implement this policy. Here we list the countries for which we have constructed our fees indicator and note cases where we have used information sources other than Kattan (2006) and Angola -Tomasevski (2006 p.18) suggests that primary school fees were abolished in 1977, but then commitment to free compulsory education disappeared during the 1990s. We found no indication from any source that Angola has subsequently abolished school fees.
Benin -Benin abolished school fees with the 2006/7 school year. We conÖrmed this with CÙte díIvoire -Identifying the exact status of school fees for CÙte díIvoire was particularly di¢cult, something that is no doubt related to the countryís recent history of political instability. Drawing on a number of di §erent sources, we were only able to establish that the Ivoirian government at one point made the Örst year of instruction free. The most detailed study available was that produced by Eric Lanoue (2003) ì Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/4: Gender and Education for All: the Leap to Equality.î Democratic Republic of Congo -There is no indication that the Congolese government has moved to abolish school fees.
Equatorial Guinea -Evidence on Equatorial Guinea was particularly limited, but we found no indication that its government had ever abolished school fees, and a US Department of State report dating from 2003 refers explicitly to the existence of school fees. See ì Equatorial Guinea: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.î Eritrea -No indication that school fees have been abolished and Bentaouet Kattan (2006) documents that they were in place.
Ethiopia -Fees abolished in 1994. Bentaouet Kattan (2006) conÖrms no tuition fees, though other fees are levied.
Gambia -There is no indication that the Gambian government has abolished school fees. A
